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Abstract 
Researching the presidential election of 1960 in Lehigh County 
has uncovered some unusual findings. The most unusual fact is that 
the Republican and Democratic candidates for President and Vice 
President all made personal appearances in this area, the only time 
this has ever occurred.  This prompted me to ask: Why did they come 
here? What issues did they discuss? What issues in Lehigh County 
were important to the outcome? 
The candidates came into the Lehigh Valley for several reasons. 
As the fourth largest metropolitan area of the state population was 
the initial factor.  Secondly, the Republicans looking at past success 
in this area hoped to continue their winning tradition.  On the other 
hand the Democrats were greatly encouraged by the trend of voter 
registration figures that had given them a numerical advantage. Well 
known as a county of ticket-splitting both parties viewed Lehigh as a 
county they could win. A fifth reason was the widespread coverage 
available to the candidates through the regions largest newspaper, the 
Call-Chronicle.  Finally, jet transportation allowed the candidates to 
cover more areas of the nation and improvements at the 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton Airport permitted their aircraft to use its 
facilities. 
The issues they raised during their appearances here were mainly 
those echoed throughout the campaign nationwide. But they did convey 
issues that they thought would be important to this region. Nixon and 
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registration figures that had given them a numerical advantage. Well 
known as a county of ticket-splitting both parties viewed Lehigh as a 
county they could win. A fifth reason was the widespread coverage 
available to the candidates through the regions largest newspaper, the 
Call-Chronicle. Finally, jet transportation allowed the candidates to 
cover more areas of the nation and improvements at the 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton Airport permitted their aircraft to use its 
facilities. 
The issues they raised during their appearances here were mainly 
those echoed throughout the campaign nationwide. But they did convey 
issues that they thought would be important to this region.  Nixon and 
Lodge stressed foreign affairs and leadership, Kennedy the economy, 
Johnson the religious question and they all provided great amounts of 
enthusiasm. 
A further examination of local issues was carried out by 
reviewing newspaper accounts of election activities and by conducting 
interviews with individuals who played a role in the campaign. 
Although each issue was important, the interviews, news articles, 
Lyndon Johnson's address in Allentown, evidence of ticket-splitting 
and a comparison of registration figures with election day statistics 
all lead me to conclude that religion was indeed a major factor in 
Lehigh County. 
Introduction 
The Presidential election of 1960 pitted against each other two 
of the more interesting political personalities of the twentieth 
century - John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon. As analysts predicted 
a close election, the outcome in Pennsylvania became increasingly 
important. This resulted in intensified personal campaigning on the 
part of the candidates. 
From October 18th to October 28th, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania 
was the stumping grounds of three future Presidents of the United 
States.  National and international issues were brought into sharp 
focus in the Lehigh Valley as Democratic Vice Presidential candidate, 
Lyndon B. Johnson (October 18th), Republican Presidential candidate, 
Richard M. Nixon (October 22nd), Republican Vice Presidential 
candidate, Henry Cabot Lodge (October 26th), and Democratic 
Presidential candidate, John F. Kennedy (October 18th), made personal 
speaking appearances. These events collectively served as perhaps the 
most politically historic occasion in the history of the region. 
Other candidates had come and gone, but never had this area of 
Pennsylvania been host to the top four candidates for national office 
within such a short period and at such an important time in our 
nation's history. 
It is my intention in this paper to identify the issues of this 
election that were important nationally, statewide and locally. Both 
those issues that were raised as positions of policy by the candidates 
and those additional factors that played a significant role in shaping 
the thoughts of the electorate will be discussed. More importantly, I 
will document why the candidates came to this region to campaign, what 
issues they thought were important to this area and what issues played 
a role in the outcome of the election in Lehigh County. 
The presence of all four candidates indicates that Lehigh County 
was an important region in a crucial swing state. 
Chapter One - National Issues 
In 1960 the American people once again observed the lengthy 
process that culminates in the election of their chief executive. As 
the year began a number of contenders for the presidency positioned 
themselves to obtain their party's nomination. 
John F. Kennedy, the Junior Senator from Massachusetts, chose the 
primary election route to propel himself into the national limelight 
as he successfully rolled up a series of victories. Lyndon B. Johnson 
of Texas, the United States Senate Majority Leader had hoped to win 
the nomination by using his position of congressional leadership to 
influence the selection of convention delegates and thus stayed out of 
the primaries.  Other potential nominees included Senator Stuart 
Symington of Missouri, who was relatively unknown outside of his home 
state and the nation's capitol, and Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey 
who contested Kennedy in the primaries. 
Kennedy, who came from a wealthy family, had a Harvard education, 
and an outstanding war record as a naval officer in World War II, had 
one major liability.  The liability was tested against Humphrey in the 
Wisconsin and West Virginia primaries.  Kennedy was a Roman Catholic 
and the nation well remembered the defeat of New York Governor, Al 
Smith, the first Catholic to be nominated for President by a major 
party in 1928.  The religious factor was to be one of the major issues 
of the entire campaign. Kennedy won in Wisconsin, which was 
Humphrey's neighboring state, but it was charged that Republican 
Catholics crossed over and voted for Kennedy.  The victory was not 
decisive, however, since West Virginia, a predominantly Protestant 
state, might be a different story.  Kennedy addressed the religious 
issue openly and won by a large margin.  The use of television and a 
strong, disciplined organization backed up by the personal appearances 
of members of his large family aided in Kennedy's victory. As a 
result, Humphrey later withdrew from the race. 
As the July convention approached, it appeared as though Kennedy 
would win the nomination despite a draft movement by the supporters of 
Adlai Stevenson, the 1952 and 1956 Democratic nominee. Again, using a 
finely tuned organization headed by his brother Robert, Kennedy won 
the nomination on the first ballot. 
Kennedy surprised the convention by choosing Johnson, who 
finished second in the Presidential balloting, as his Vice 
Presidential running mate. Although this angered many, particularly 
liberals of the Americans for Democratic Action, who said Johnson was 
too conservative, the Kennedys believed that Johnson could hold the 
South for the Democrats in November.  Johnson in turn was condemned 
by southern politicians for endorsing the civil rights plank of the 
convention and for accepting the Vice-Presidency with a Catholic. 
Vice-President Richard Nixon's nomination to head the Republican 
ticket was virtually assured when New York Governor, Nelson 
Rockefeller indicated late in 1959 that he would not seek the 
presidency.  He did not endorse Nixon though, and just before the 
convention was quite critical of some of the Vice-President's 
Eugene H. Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elections, 3rd Ed., 
(New York, 1970), p. 551. 
programs. A subsequent meeting helped to ease this tension and 
certain agreements were reached. 
To emphasize the importance of foreign affairs, a key element of 
the Nixon campaign, he named Henry Cabot Lodge, Ambassador to the 
United Nations and former Senator to run for Vice-President. 
The choice of nominees by the party conventions, perhaps tell us 
even more than the candidates did, that foreign affairs and national 
security were of great importance in this election year.  The 
delegates deviated from the norm for only the third time since 1880 by 
not selecting as one of the two candidates for president, a governor 
or former governor. 
Nixon's nomination was the first time since 1836, when Martin Van 
Buren was elected President, that a Vice-President was granted the 
nomination of a major party without first having become President due 
3 
to a death.  Furthermore, Kennedy became only the second U.S. Senator 
4 
in the twentieth century to receive the presidential nomination. 
As the campaign began, both candidates laid out a central issue 
that was to become the theme of their respective candidacies.  This 
central issue was perceived in both camps as the Soviet Union's threat 
to America's security.   The candidates repeatedly addressed this 
issue but each in different terms. Republican policy makers believed 
that "experienced leadership" to keep the Soviets in check was the 
2 ~ 
James A. Kehl,  Presidential Sweepstakes in Review:  Seen From the 
1960 Starting Gate." Pennsylvania History, 31 (April, 1964), p. 217. 
jlbid., p. 217. 
ZIbid., p. 220-221. 
Stanley Kelley, Jr., "The Presidential Campaign," The Presidential 
Election and Transition 1960-1961, (Washington, 1961), p. 66. 
theme necessary to convey to the public the image they wanted for 
their candidate. Nixon having served as an active Vice-President for 
the previous eight years certainly could lay legitimate claim to the 
theme of experience despite the fact that he and Kennedy began their 
careers in the Congress at the same time.  Nixon stated, 
"When we came into office in 1953 (The Eisenhower Administration) 
the United States was at war. We have ended one war; we have 
avoided other wars; and today we do have peace and have it 
without surrender of principle or territory..." 
It was these achievements that Nixon hoped to build upon if he was 
elected. 
While experience was stressed by the G.O.P., Democratic 
strategists wove the word movement into the fabric of Kennedy's 
campaign.  Kennedy insisted that the nation had been mistreated by our 
foreign adversaries and it was time to move again.  "I say we can do 
better" and "I say we need to move again", were phrases that were used 
over and over again in Kennedy's addresses.  This reflected his 
position that the nation had stood still during the Elsenhower-Nixon 
years. It also helped to turn his youthful image into an asset by 
pointing out that a new generation of Americans was going to rebuild 
the image of the United States. 
In August, Newsweek released the results of their nationwide 
survey of voters and found that "United States foreign policy...towers 
above all others as the number one issue of the coming Presidential 
g 
Campaign."  At this time the voting public had little awareness of 
Jlbid. 
glbid., p. 68. 
Newsweek, August 1, 1960, p. 26-28. 
the competency of Kennedy in dealing with other nations.  As far as 
they were concerned, when viewing foreign affairs, Nixon was for the 
most part their favorite.  This became apparent when the results of a 
national telephone poll made for Kennedy between August 13th and the 
18th revealed "that the three foreign policy issues came out as most 
important."  The poll showed that whenever an individual singled out 
an issue as most important it partly predicted how the person would 
react on election day and also if they had made up their mind.  "Those 
voters who singled out foreign policy as the most important issue in 
the campaign were most likely to have already made up their minds and 
were for Nixon."   Of those who identified negotiations with the 
Russians as the most important issue 44% preferred Nixon, while 37% 
favored Kennedy and 19% were undecided.  Those selecting keeping ahead 
of the Russians as the most important issue favored Nixon over Kennedy 
43% to 39% with 18% undecided.  The third category of developing 
missiles favored Kennedy by 39% to 38% for Nixon and 23% were 
undecided. 
This survey, the knowledge of the Newsweek poll, and other polls 
done for both candidates further prompted Kennedy and Nixon to make 
foreign affairs a major issue. 
As a result over the course of the campaign, three basic issues 
dealing with foreign policy emerged.  One was the position of prestige 
9 
Robert P. Abelson, and others, Candidates Issues and Strategies A 
Computer Simulation of the 1960 Presidential Election, (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1964), p. 84. 
JJlbld., p. 85. 
Ibid., p. 86.  Note:  See Table 2.2 for candidate preference on 
other issues. 
of the United States abroad and the growth of Soviet military, 
scientific, economic and political strength.  Nikita Khrushchev was 
recognized in this nation and around the world as the symbol of these 
issues which threatened U.S. security.  Kennedy held that our prestige 
was sliding and the so-called missile gap with the Soviet Union helped 
to illustrate his complaint that America was second best during the 
1950's. Nixon would not reveal the contents of intelligence reports 
dealing with this subject.  Therefore, the Democrats having no first 
12 hand evidence, were suspicious of Soviet superiority.   The response 
of the Vice-Presldent was that Kennedy was actually damaging the 
nation's prestige by implying that we were faltering and repeatedly 
13 
stated he was "running down" the United States. 
The second foreign policy confrontation dealt with Cuba. Kennedy 
pointed to the Castro communist regime take over of Cuba, which was 
only 90 miles from the United States, as an example of the decline of 
our foreign policy under the Republicans.  The Democratic candidate 
then proposed a four point solution to deal with the Cuban issue.  In 
this instance and when speaking of our declining prestige abroad, 
Kennedy forced Nixon to defend the actions of the Eisenhower 
Administration.  However, the third point of Kennedy's four point 
program for Cuba reversed the situation.  Kennedy stated, "We must 
attempt to strengthen the non-Batista Democratic anti-Castro forces in 
exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing 
_ 
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., ed., History of American Presidential 
Elections 1784-1968, (New York, 1971), p. 3465.  Note the section on 
.the 1960 election was written by Theodore C. Sorensen. 
Stanley Kelley, Jr., "The 1960 Presidential Election," Presidential 
Election A Simulation With Readings, (New York, 1969), p. 193. 
10 
14 Castro."   When asked to comment at the fourth televised debate on 
Kennedy's Cuban position, Nixon offered a strong retort.  He noted 
Kennedy's comments to be "probably the most dangerously irresponsible 
recommendations that he had made during the course of the campaign." 
Nixon believed that Kennedy's actions would violate the United 
Nations' Charter, numerous Latin American treaties and serve as an 
invitation for the Soviet Union to intervene in Latin America. 
Kennedy prompted the third issue to surface when in response to a 
question, he insisted that Quemoy and Matsu, two small islands off the 
coast of Communist China, were not defensible and therefore, should be 
vacated by the Nationalist Chinese.   Nixon again was highly critical 
of Kennedy's comments. 
"We should not force our Nationalist allies to get off them and 
give them to the Communists.  If we do that we start a chain 
reaction because the Communists aren't after Quemoy and Matsu. 
They're after Formosa.  In my opinion this is the same kind of 
wooly thinking that led to disaster for America in Korea." 
In time, the issue faded as both candidates agreed to defend 
Formosa, Nixon stating that the islands should be defended as a means 
of protecting Formosa, and Kennedy saying they "should not be defended 
19 
unless that was essential to protect Formosa." 
All three of these issues gained a great deal of attention in the 
nation's media but as Theodore Sorensen points out "the three most 
jflbid., p. 194. 
Jflbid., p. 194. 
^Ibid., p. 194. 
1RSchlesinger, Presidential Elections, p. 3465. 
JgKelley, "The 1960 Presidential Election," p. 194. 
Schlesinger, Presidential Elections, p. 3465-3466. 
11 
solidly identifiable foreign policy issues in the campaign turned out 
20 to have very little substantive content." 
An economic slowdown and job layoffs of hundreds of thousands of 
people indicating the possibility of a recession were among domestic 
issues of national concern.  The rise in unemployment brought out the 
issue of how the current administration was managing the economy and 
both candidates were aware of these implications.  The vacillating 
unemployment rate for the civilian labor force during the later half 
of the Eisenhower Administration is illustrated by figures in Table 
1.1. 
21 Table 1.1 National Unemployment Rate 1956-1961 
1956-4.2 
1957-4.3 
1958-6.8 
1959-5.5 
1960-5.6 
1961-6.7 
Nixon was forced to defend these statistics and the 
administration's policies by talking down the existence of any 
recessionary activity, whereas Kennedy spoke out for the development 
of jobs and expanded economic growth.  Regardless of how unemployment 
was measured, the figures demonstrate that "unemployment probably had 
a far greater political impact in 1958 - when the Democratic party 
made exceptionally wide gains - than in 1960, for unemployment dropped 
in 1959 and I960."22 
2°Ibid-» P- 3465. 
V.O. Key Jr., The Responsible Electorate, (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 
„p. 108. 
Ibid., p. 109. 
12 
When dealing with the economy as well as other domestic social 
issues, both candidates spoke in the traditions of their respective 
parties. Kennedy pointing to three recessions in six years under the 
Republicans, called for increased federal spending in the areas of 
housing, education and medical care for senior citizens, along with 
farm subsidies and assistance for depressed regions.  Nixon countered 
that Kennedy's programs would mean inflation, more taxes and runaway 
spending and that the federal government should be interested in only 
23 
stimulating the private sector of the economy. 
With respect to yet another potentially volatile domestic 
concern, responding to questions from a black newspaper reporter over 
concessions to Southern white voters, Senator Kennedy restated Hubert 
Humphrey's campaign pledge.  He said, "if anyone expected him to 
betray the cause of civil rights for political expediency they could 
24 look for another candidate."   Kennedy addressed the need for 
legislative action to deal with civil rights by calling for better 
social and economic programs and at the same time began to attract 
increasing support from the black and liberal communities. 
Dissatisfaction with Kennedy's views on this issue prevailed among 
Southern white voters. However, the selection of Lyndon Johnson as 
his running mate paid-off in this instance, as Johnson made repeated 
campaign stops in the South and eased the Southern conservatives, who 
were wary of Kennedy's stand on civil rights, into the Democratic 
fold. 
_ 
„,Roseboom, Presidential Elections, p. 557. 
Carl M. Brauer, John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction, (New 
York, 1977), p. 33. 
13 
In the meantime, Nixon was having difficulties wooing Southern 
whites as well, because the Republican Convention had adopted its 
strongest pro-civil rights plank in history.  To further complicate 
this action, Henry Cabot Lodge, campaigning in Harlem in October, 
stated that a black would be selected for a cabinet position if the 
Republicans were victorious.  This statement proved to be of great 
embarrassment to the ticket, as Nixon later repudiated Lodge's comment 
and further on stated that it "plagued them through the rest of the 
,  ,.25 
campaign. 
In the North, particularly in the cities, the black vote had been 
traditionally Democratic.  However, the figures on party preference 
compiled as a result of 4,050 interviews with Northern blacks revealed 
a shift to the Republicans during the 1956 and 1958 elections. The 
percentages listed in table 1.2 illustrate. 
Table 1.2 Party Preference Among Blacks 1952-1958 
1952 1954 1956 1958 
Democrats 58% 59% 53% 52% 
Republicans 18% 17% 23% 24% 
Independents 24% 25% 24% 24% 
Kennedy, recognizing the importance of the black vote made an extra 
effort to attract it and was successful. 
The incident that perhaps played the greatest role in turning out 
black votes had to do with the arrest of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
When King was arrested for trespassing during a sit-in in Atlanta and 
sentenced to jail, Kennedy phoned Mrs. King to express his concern. 
Robert Kennedy later phoned the local judge and aided in King's 
release. 
2^Ibid., p. 42. 
Abelson, Candidates Issues and Strategies, p. 95-96. 
14 
Although their calls did not become a major campaign story, the 
Kennedys actions received widespread publicity in the black community, 
a subsequent endorsement from Dr. King's father and strong words of 
gratitude from King himself. This was aided by the distribution of 
Kennedy literature about the incident in black communities and outside 
27 black churches the Sunday before the election.   In contrast, Nixon 
remained silent throughout the whole affair choosing not to further 
offend Southern white voters he was hoping to attract. Aside from the 
issues of foreign and domestic policy, there are two others which 
perhaps more than anything else, affected the outcome of the election 
- Kennedy's Catholicism and the televised debates. 
Although many thought the religious questions were answered by 
Kennedy's defeat of Hubert Humphrey in the West Virginia primary, the 
issue surfaced again in September when the Reverend Norman Vincent 
Peale issued a statement on behalf of an organization of prominent 
Protestant clergyman charging the Catholic Church with meddling in 
28 political affairs.   As a result, Kennedy accepted an invitation to 
speak to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association in Texas where he 
was to discuss his religion and the impact it would have on his 
decisions if he were elected President. Kennedy spoke in favor of 
absolute separation of church and state, "where no religious body 
seeks to impose its will directly or indirectly upon the general 
populace or the public acts of its officials" and against 
29 
unconstitutional aid to non-public schools.   Even though this 
27 
-„Brauer, Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction, p. 46-50. 
.qSchlesinger, Presidential Elections, p. 3467. 
yibid., p. 3559-3561. 
15 
response was satisfactory to the upper levels of the Protestant 
Church, it did not quell the hatred and the bigotry that continued 
throughout the campaign. 
While hundreds of clergymen of all faiths from throughout the 
nation expressed belief that religious affiliation should not be "a 
test of fitness for the Presidency", close to two hundred different 
publications were anonymously circulated which attacked Kennedy and 
30 Catholicism in general. 
Other than this speech, both Kennedy and Nixon felt it was in 
their best interest to keep quiet on the issue. The day after 
Kennedy's presentation Nixon stated while campaigning in Oregon that 
"Senator Kennedy's statement of his views should be accepted without 
further question" and announced that "neither he nor his staff would 
31 have anything further to say about Kennedy's religious affiliation." 
Nixon earlier proposed that neither candidate discuss the issue after 
a certain date.  He now ordered all Republican organizations not to 
permit any reference to his opponents religion by way of appeal to 
32 
prejudice or rebuttal to prejudiced statements.   While Kennedy 
personally remained silent on his Catholicism after the Houston 
appearance the Democratic Committee filmed his speech for future 
showings in Protestant areas. 
Republicans were fearful that Catholic Republicans and 
Independents would be so offended by religious slurs that they would 
feel an obligation to vote for Kennedy.  The Democrats were hoping 
_ 
^.Kelley, "The Presidential Campaign," p. 78-79. 
jjlbid., p. 78. 
Abelson, Candidates Issues and Strategies, p. 44. 
16 
that a Catholic at the head of the ticket would greatly aid them among 
Catholic voters.  Not only with a Republican crossover vote, but with 
a strong Democratic turnout.  Robert Axelrod makes this point in 
"Where The Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions 
1952-1968." 
"The Catholics have formed a large and reliable segment of the 
Democratic coalition. They have always provided more than a 
third of the Democratic votes even though they are only a quarter 
of the population (according to his formula).  Part of the reason 
is their exceptionally high turnout.  The other part of the 
reason is their steadfast loyalty which has always been more„than 
10 percent greater than that of the population as a whole." 
Studies of campaign strategy indicate that great attention was 
focused on the Catholic vote by the Democrats particularly in those 
states with large Catholic populations.  Sorensen states that the one 
factor that influenced more swing voters than anything else was 
Kennedy's religion.  But that while he successfully attracted large 
numbers of Catholic Democrats he lost millions of Protestant Democrats 
to Nixon. 
Many agree that when the votes were counted, the fact that 
Kennedy was a Catholic hurt him to a large degree in the popular vote. 
But on the other hand, those same observers agree that it may have 
helped him in the Electoral vote.  This is demonstrated by Kennedy's 
slim margins of victory in states outside the South with large numbers 
35 
of Catholic voters and larger numbers of Electoral votes. 
33 
Robert Axelrod, "Where The Votes Come From: An Analysis of 
Electoral Coalitions 1952-1968," American Political Science Review, 
3466, p. 16. 
_,.Schlesinger, Presidential Elections, p. 3469. 
Herbert Asher, Presidential Elections and American Politics, 
(Homewood, 111., 1960), p. 243-144. 
17 
Writing about the election in his book Six Crises, Nixon 
indicates that he shared this belief all along.  He stated, 
"Kennedy's religion was obviously going to be a major factor in 
the election...From the outset, though, I had no doubts whatever 
on this score:  I believed that Kennedy's religion would hurt him 
in states he could afford to lose anyway, and that it would help 
him in states he needed to win." 
A second issue of great consequence arose as a result of the 
agreement by both candidates and the networks to hold a series of four 
televised debates.  This agreement was reached only after Congress 
repealed the equal-time provision of the Federal Communications Act of 
1934 which stated that the networks had to invite the minor party 
37 
candidates.   With a great majority of the population having access 
to television, both candidates felt they had something to gain by 
joint appearances and thus, accepted the terms of debate. Nixon 
recognized that as the candidate of the minority party, he was going 
to need greater exposure to Independents and Democrats, if he were 
going to win the election. Kennedy viewed the debates as a means of 
becoming better known and of demonstrating that he had, despite the 
Republican charges to the contrary, the necessary experience and 
qualifications to be President. 
The first debate, however, did the greatest damage to Nixon 
because he appeared pale and in poor health (in part due to a recent 
hospital stay for a knee infection), and was at times unsure of 
himself.  It was unfortunate for Nixon that he apparently made an 
—_ 
Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises, (New York, 1962), p. 330. 
Robert E. Gilbert, Television and Presidential Politics, (North 
Quincey, Mass., 1972), p. 164-165. 
18 
unfavorable impression on the public because he looked "tense, haggard 
op 
and anxious."   Kennedy proved to be just the opposite as he 
"projected the image of a dynamic, intelligent and articulate 
39 leader."   Furthermore, his performance rallied the party faithful, 
40 increased enthusiasm toward the ticket  and brought political 
41 
endorsements and greater financial support.   Although Nixon's 
appearance and performance improved in subsequent debates, the effects 
of the first debate stayed with him.  Edward W. Chester in his book 
Radio, Television, and American Politics observes the following shift 
in public opinion subsequent to the first debate. 
"His image as an unbeatable television debater shattered, Nixon 
saw his 47 to 46 percent lead over Kennedy in a national Gallery 
poll prior to the first debate give way to a Kennedy lead of 49 
to 46 percent following it.  Nixon may have narrowed the gap 
between then and the election but he never completely closed 
it."4^ 
Most sources agree that overall, the debates were of great 
significance to the Kennedy campaign.  Initially they put him on an 
equal recognition basis with Nixon and secondly, they established him 
as a mature, "quick-witted ready speaker." 
The following statistics provide evidence of the great interest 
the public had in the debates and thus, the exposure each candidate 
received. 
OQ 
Edward W. Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics, New 
York, 1969), p. 120. 
.^Gilbert, Television and Presidential Politics, p. 169. 
,-Asher, Presidential Elections and American Politics, p. 155. 
.^Gilbert, Television and Presidential Politics, p. 170. 
.-Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics, p. 120. 
H. F. Harding, and others, "Presidential Campaign 1960:  A Symposium 
Part II Contest For The Presidency," The Quarterly Journal of 
Speech, 46, p. 363. 
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1. Nine out of ten television families (89.8%) tuned in the 
debates. 
2. More than one half of all television families (53.1%) watched 
at least three debates. 
3. One out of four television families (26.6%) tuned in all four 
debates. 
Arbitron rating service estimated the audiences for each of the 
four debates at between 70 to 75 million for the first, 61 million for 
the second, 65 million for the third and 64 million for the final 
debate. 
The debates themselves were not without their critics as they 
were labeled by some to be more like joint press conferences with 
millions of viewers, where the format allowed no true debate to take 
place.   V. 0. Key referred to them as "affairs" that "hovered at a 
47 level somewhere in the neighborhood of bush-league college debates." 
Nevertheless, a few days after the election, Kennedy was quoted as 
48 
saying, "It was T.V. more than anything else that turned the tide." 
While both candidates called for a variety of foreign and 
domestic programs to achieve their goals, the religious issue and the 
impression they left with the public, as a result of the televised 
debates, were to weigh heavily in the outcome. 
44 Sidney Kraus,   ed.,  The Great Debates,   (Bloomington,  Indiana,   1962), 
45p.   68. 
Henrietta and Nelson Poynter,  ed.   Politics In America  1945-1966,  2nd 
ed.,   (Washington,   1967),  p.   37. 
Harding,  "Presidential Campaign 1960" The Quarterly Journal of 
Speech,  p.  363. 
.-Key, Responsible Electorate, p. 112. 
Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960, (New York, 
1962), p. 294. 
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Chapter Two - Pennsylvania An Overview 
After their party conventions each candidate developed an 
electoral strategy.  The Kennedy forces identified nine large states 
(New York, Pennsylvania, California, Michigan, Texas, Illinois, Ohio, 
New Jersey and Massachusetts) as crucial, but would concentrate "the 
supreme Kennedy effort in the industrial Northeast where seven states 
of the big nine clustered." It was Lyndon Johnson's responsibility to 
carry his native state of Texas, while Adlai Stevenson would work 
California with Kennedy devoting four personal days to campaign 
there. 
Nixon's aides focused on the big seven, California, New York, 
Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Michigan. And while Kennedy 
was worried about the Protestant and suburban vote Nixon was concerned 
2 
about the Catholic and farm vote. 
With both candidates placing the result of the election on the 
outcome of the larger electoral states, their public appearances in 
these states greatly increased during the final month of the campaign. 
Pennsylvania, with its 32 electoral votes, was among those that 
received their attention.  Traditionally dominated by Republicans, 
Pennsylvania was considered a swing state in recent years and was 
shifting from Republican to Democrat.  In 1954 George Leader became 
the second Democrat in this century to be elected Governor.  In 1956 
despite the Eisenhower sweep of the Commonwealth, Democrat Joseph 
White, Making of the President 1960, p. 247. 
Ibid., p. 266. 
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Clark was elected to the U.S. Senate.  Two years later Catholic David 
Lawrence, the former Democratic Mayor of Pittsburgh was elected to the 
Governor's chair.  Statewide registration figures provide the best 
evidence that Pennsylvania Republicans were losing ground to their 
Democratic rivals.  These statistics show a gradual decline of the 
Republican majority in Pennsylvania throughout the 1950's. 
Table 2.1.  Pennsylvania Voter Registration„Figures 
for Congressional Elections 1952-1960 
Republicans Democrats Difference 
1952 3,130,078 2,136,511 +993,567 R 
1954 2,995,971 2,088,857 +907,114 R 
1956 2,897,307 2,450,396 +446,911 R 
1958 2,771,613 2,554,007 +217,606 R 
1960 2,802,237 2,805,202 + 2,965 D 
By 1960 when the Democrats took the lead by 2,965 votes it was 
reported that, "For the first time since the Republicans came to life 
in Pennsylvania by electing Andrew Curtain in 1860 the Democratic 
Party is ahead in the number of qualified voters." 
Registration figures indicated that the Democrats held their lead 
statewide as a result of large majorities in the urban areas. 
Allegheny County and the City of Pittsburgh listed a Democratic 
majority of 213,553 while in Philadelphia Democrats led by 178,463. 
These figures prompted Pittsburgh Democrats to say that the city was 
now safe for Kennedy.  On top of the registration lead in Pittsburgh, 
Kennedy was also supported by one of Pennsylvania's most powerful 
_ 
Iris Richey, ed., The Pennsylvania Manual, 95, (Harrisburg, PA, 
1962), For 1960 figures, p. 509. For 1958, 94, p. 502; 1956, 93, p. 
508; 1954, 92, p. 104; 1952, 91, p. 101. 
,-Allentown Morning Call, November 3, 1960, p. 8. 
Richey, Pennsylvania Manual, 95, p. 509. 
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local Democratic organizations built largely by Governor David 
Lawrence when he was Mayor of Pittsburgh.  In 1960 the Pittsburgh 
organization was controlled by Mayor Joseph Barr former chairman of 
the Democratic State Committee.  In addition, Kennedy received the 
endorsement of David J. McDonald, President of the United 
Steelworkers, a strong political force in the region. While these 
factors were working in favor of Kennedy, Nixon was benefiting by 
large contributions from Pittsburgh businesses.  In Philadelphia it 
was the first time the Democrats held a registration lead in the 
Commonwealth's largest city for a presidential election. 
These figures were bolstered in part because the Kennedy 
organization placed a great deal of importance on an effective voter 
registration drive concentrating particularly in the lower 
middle-class and working class neighborhoods of cities.  It was 
estimated by the Kennedy staff that approximately 40,000,000 of the 
107,000,000 eligible voters nationwide had not registered to vote.  It 
was also believed that 70 percent of the 40 million would vote 
Democratic if they would go to the polls. 
The final results of the registration efforts in the urban areas 
were in their favor by 5-3 margins in Pittsburgh and 2-1 margins in 
9 
Philadelphia.   In Lackawanna County (Scranton), the Democratic 
majority was 2-1 while strong gains were made in once predominantly 
Republican Luzerne and Schuylkill Counties.   Populous Erie County 
.-Morning Call, November 1, 1960, p. 11. 
-Ibid. , October 22, p.l. 
-White, Making of the President I960, p. 247. 
^Kelley, "The 1960 Presidential Election," p. 186.. 
1
 Newsweek, October 17, 1960, p. 29 
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had taken a Democratic lead for the first time in many years by just 
over a thousand voters and heavily Democratic Berks had extended its 
registration to over 34,000. An indepth look at Lehigh County and 
the City of Allentown will be undertaken in Chapter Three. 
Looking at the total results nationwide, the combined effort of 
both the Kennedy and Nixon registration drives produced 6,800,000 more 
12 
voters in 1960 than were registered in 1956.   In Pennsylvania there 
were 265,687 more people registered to vote since the last 
13 presidential election.   Note that this figure includes nonpartisan 
and other party registrants. Although the Republican drive was not as 
extensive as that of the Democrats it was not because they did not 
make the effort.  Sometime after the election Nixon stated that a 
factor contributing to his defeat was the inability of the Republicans 
14 to compete with the Democratic efforts to register union members. 
Republican strategists were hoping that despite Democratic gains 
in the urban areas of Pennsylvania they could offset this by a strong 
voter turnout in the suburban counties especially Delaware which held 
a 169,512 Republican lead and Montgomery where Republicans out 
numbered Democrats by 127,896 voters. 
Statewide, the economy and Kennedy's religion were receiving the 
most attention from Pennsylvania voters.  In the steel producing areas 
in particular, unemployment was beginning to cause great concern.  A 
1?Richey, Pennsylvania Manual, 95, p. 509. 
..White, Making of the President 1960, p. 247. 
..Richey, Pennsylvania Manual, 93, p. 509; 95, p. 510. 
15Kelley, "The Presidential Campaign," p. 64. 
Richey, Pennsylvania Manual, 96, p. 509. 
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look at the following data is useful for a comparison of unemployment 
trends in some of the more heavily populated areas of the state. 
Table 2.2.  Pennsylvania Regional Rates of Unemployment 
1958-1960lb 
1958 1959 1960 
Statewide 10.8 9.3 8.3 
Allentown, Bethlehem, 
Easton, excluding N, ,J. 8.8 7.4 5.8 
Erie 13.9 12.0 9.9 
Harrisburg 7.0 5.0 5.3 
Johnstown 15.3 16.6 14.1 
Philadelphia 
excluding N.J. 10.0 8.6 7.4 
Pittsburgh 11.3 9.9 9.4 
Northeast 15.7 14.8 11.7 
Scranton 15.9 14.7 12.2 
Wilkes-Barre-Haze! Lton 17.1 16.0 12.1 
Although unemployment figures were down in 1960 compared to 1958 and 
1959, large layoffs were taking place in the coal, steel and railroad 
industries and many feared a repeat of two years earlier. 
The question of federal aid to some of these areas that were 
chronically depressed also became a key issue to winning Pennsylvania 
as both candidates stressed it while campaigning in the state. Nixon 
stated that the Republican plan for depressed areas would provide 
greater assistance to the Scranton-Wilkes-Barre-Hazelton area than 
would the Democratic legislation.  But Kennedy countered by saying 
that President Eisenhower had twice vetoed the aid bills that passed 
the Congress.  Because of the significance of this issue in some 
Pennsylvania Adjusted Resident Labor Force Date 1958, 1959, 1960 
provided by the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, 
.Harrisburg, PA. 
Time, October 10, 1960, p. 25. 
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sections of the state, it was believed it would affect the outcome of 
certain congressional elections. 
The question of Kennedy's religion led journalists to speculate 
on whether or not it would help or hinder the Senator's chances.  The 
Democratic strongholds in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh had large 
Catholic populations whereas the smaller towns and rural areas were 
19 
overwhelmingly Protestant.   In two separate issues of Time Magazine 
the following points were brought out. Despite Pennsylvania's 31% 
20 Catholic population  which would assist Kennedy, the Pennsylvania 
Dutch were concerned about his Catholicism and registered "in large 
21 
numbers for the first time since 1928." 
In Berks County, Lehigh's western neighbor, there was great 
concern among Democratic leaders over the consequence of Kennedy's 
religion. The Allentown Morning Call quoted a Berks Democrat as 
saying, Kennedy's Catholicism was "certain to have an effect on the 
outspoken Protestants of the Berks 'Bible belt'." On this point the 
Berks County Democratic Chairman, Bruce R. Coleman stated, "The only 
thing that might hurt our presidential candidate is the religious 
issue.  There is a small group of old people still carrying the torch 
of 1928." Another party spokesman agreed saying he felt "the 
religious issue was lying around not being talked about but waiting to 
__ 
10Morning Call, October 28, p. 17. 
jglbid., October 4, 1960, p. 11. 
ffiime, November 7, 1960, p. 25. 
Ibid., October 10, 1960, p. 25. 
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erupt.  If the voters do cross party lines, they will be anti-Kennedy 
22 
and not pro-Nixon." 
Perhaps the best account of this issue is told by James Michener 
in Report to the County Chairman where he reveals his personal 
experiences in neighboring Bucks County. As Chairman of the Bucks 
County citizens for Kennedy Committee, Michener received untold 
numbers of letters that began with "Did you know that the Catholic 
Church...and ended with a miserable recital of lies, historic fact, 
sexual indecency and legitimate comment on Church excesses in Spain 
23 
and Venezuela."   Anti-Catholic books and literature, many of which 
contain great distortion, made their way into all sections of Bucks 
County.  Although I could find no specific instance of its use in 
Lehigh County, the Morning Call of October 28, 1960 reports the 
appearance of similar literature in Bethlehem, Northampton County.  A 
pamphlet entitled "Here are the Facts" was circulated at a rally for 
Vice-Presidential candidate, Henry Cabot Lodge, but it was never 
24 determined who was responsible for its distribution. 
An Associated Press Poll taken five weeks before the election 
25 
rated Pennsylvania as a "toss-up".   Three weeks before election day 
another Associated Press survey indicated that Kennedy had pulled even 
and "might be gaining an advantage in some of the big doubtful states 
22 
Morning Call, November 1, 1960, p. 5.  Note all quotes about Berks 
- County taken from this article. 
James A. Michener, Report of the County Chairman, (New York, 1961), 
p. 89-90. 
^Morning Call, October 28, 1960, p. 7. 
Ibid. , October 3, 1960, p. 1. 
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26 like New York, California, Michigan and Pennsylvania."   On November 
4th, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report viewed the outcome in 
Pennsylvania like this: 
"Both Kennedy and Nixon supporters are adamant in assertions that 
their man will carry the state and win its 32 electoral votes. 
Principal factors aiding Nixon appear to be the state's 
traditional Republicanism, deep-seated anti-Catholic sentiment 
(especially through the rural areas of the state), President 
Eisenhower's recent warm endorsement for Nixon in a Philadelphia 
speech, and some private polls giving Nixon a Pennsylvania lead. 
Kennedy supporters are encouraged by record Democratic 
registration (especially in Philadelphia), the anticipated 
election day benefits of state political patronage, an expected 
heavy Catholic bloc vote for Kennedy, and weak spots in the 
state's economy.  Steel production, which is centered in 
Pennsylvania, is running at a very low level and statewide 
unemployment is estimated at 7.7 percent." 
With both sides claiming victory and recognizing Pennsylvania as 
a vital state that appeared certain to be close the candidates made 
repeated personal appearances in the Commonwealth. 
Chapter three will identify the reasons why Lehigh County and the 
greater Lehigh Valley became one of the focal points of the campaign 
in Pennsylvania. 
j^Ibid., October 18, 1960, p. 1. 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, November 4, 1960, p. 1826. 
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Chapter Three - The Attraction of Lehigh County 
For this study Lehigh County needs to be evaluated in two ways. 
First politically as part of the 8th Congressional District comprising 
all of Lehigh County including the City of Allentown and to its south 
all of Bucks County. And secondly geographically as part of the 
Lehigh Valley which is generally viewed as all of Lehigh County and to 
its east all of Northampton County including most of the City of 
Bethlehem and the City of Easton.  This region of Pennsylvania outside 
of the greater Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and Scranton-Wilkes-Barre 
areas was an attraction to the candidates for national office not only 
because of its population which was a factor but as I will demonstrate 
for other reasons as well. 
The 8th Congressional District was represented in Congress by two 
term incumbent Republican Representative Willard S. Curtain of Bucks 
County.  It was believed that Curtain would win reelection because of 
a low Catholic population and also because of "good Republican County 
2 
organizations."  His opponent was a well-known orator and former 
Mayor of Allentown, Attorney Donald Hock.  With the growth of industry 
in lower Bucks County and the challenge of a recognizable Democrat the 
Republicans could not be guaranteed a victory.  Late in the campaign 
Lehigh County Democratic Chairman Roy Reabuck stated that because of 
tremendous enthusiasm among Democrats for the Kennedy-Johnson ticket 
they had "a good chance of winning the Congressional seat."  However, 
„Richey, Pennsylvania Manual, 95, p. 958. 
»Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, November 4, 1960, p. 1826. 
Morning Call, November 2, 1960, p. 5. 
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in an interview I conducted with Attorney Hock he confirmed just the 
opposite stating that he felt he didn't have a good chance for 
Congress "because Democratic Candidates for Congress in Bucks-Lehigh 
just weren't winning." 
The voter registration figures in Bucks although still heavily 
Republican in 1960 had shown a steady decline of the percentage of 
difference between the two parties and a tremendous growth in 
population. (See Table 3.1 for the registration figures.)  Population 
figures for Bucks indicate a 113.36% increase from 1950 to 1960, the 
highest rate of growth for any county in Pennsylvania. 
Table 3.1.  Bucks County Voter RegistrationfiFigures for 
Congressional Elections 1952-1960 
Republicans Democrats Difference 
1952 51,539 19,687 +31,852 R 
1954 57,583 25,753 +31,830 R 
1956 66,503 41,898 +24,605 R 
1958 69,341 50,509 +18,832 R 
1960 76,354 59,559 +16,795 R 
Northampton County, part of the 15th Congressional District 
represented by veteran Congressman Francis Walters was traditionally a 
strong Democratic County.  The home of Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 
the county had a large number of steelworker union members and other 
trade unionists who worked hand in hand with the Democratic party. 
Voter registration figures since 1952 showed a gradual Increase in 
favor of the Democrats and by 1960 they enjoyed an edge of 24,105. 
_ 
.Donald Hock taped interview, August 6, 1982. 
-Richey, Pennsylvania Manual, 95, p. 958. 
Ibid. Figures for 1960, 95, p. 509; For 1958, 94, p. 502; 1956, 93, 
p. 508; 1954, 92, p. 104; 1952, 91, p. 101. 
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Table 3.2.  Northampton County Voter Registration Figures 
For Congressional Elections 1952-1960 
Republicans Democrats Difference 
1952 35,643 52,509 +16,866 D 
1954 35,492 52,746 +17,254 D 
1956 35,296 56,300 +21,004 D 
1958 33,966 56,455 +22,489 D 
1960 34,067 58,172 +24,105 D 
The vote count in Bucks for president and governor for 1952-1958 
revealed a Republican pattern.  While Northampton despite its 
Democratic registration lead went Republican for president in 1952 and 
1956 and Democratic for governor in 1954 and 1958. 
Table 3.3.  Bucks County Vote Totals_for President 
and Governor 1952-1958 
Republican Democrat 
1952 Eisenhower-40,753 Stevenson-24,301 
1954 Wood-32,339 Leader-31,005 
1956 Eisenhower-59,862 Stevenson-38,541 
1958 McGonigle-46,742 Lawrence-41,199 
Table 3.4. Northampton County Vote Totals for 
President and Governor 1952-1958 
Republican Democrat 
1952 Eisenhower-39,131 Stevenson-36,993 
1954 Wood-23,343 Leader-37,157 
1956 Eisenhower-43,375 Stevenson-33,749 
1958 McGonigle-29,204 Lawrence-34,658 
These figures and those of Lehigh County are, as I will 
demonstrate, a contributing factor to the candidates decision to 
campaign in this region of Pennsylvania. 
plbid., 
Ibid., Figures for 1958, 94, p. 507; 1956, 93, p. 512; 1954, 92, p. 
108; 1952, 91, p. 103. 
yibid. 
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In 1960 Lehigh County Democrats took the lead in voter 
registration by a very slight 319 voters for the first time since 
1944.  The count also showed the highest number of potential voters 
ever totaling 105,150.  Republicans continued to lead in the City of 
Allentown and the townships  but even the Allentown figures evidenced 
an erosion of Republican strength. 
Table 3.5.  Lehigh County Voter Registration Figures 
for Congressional Elections 1952-1960 
Republicans 
1952 45,574 
1954 45,836 
1956 47,695 
1958 47,439 
1960 51,760 
Democrats Difference 
41,483 +4,091 R 
41,702 +4,134 R 
44,902 +2,793 R 
46,867 + 572 R 
52,079 + 319 D 
Table 3.6.  City of Allentown Voter Registration Figures 
for Congressional Elections 1952-1960 
Republicans 
1952 24,306 
1954 23,898 
1956 24,130 
1958 23,420 
1960 25,109 
Democrats Difference 
21,640 +2,666 R 
21,215 +2,683 R 
22,177 +1,953 R 
22,303 +1,117 R 
24,498 + 611 R 
These figures indicate that despite the formerly strong G.O.P. 
following in this area their base of support was slipping and now 
vulnerable to the Democrats.  By examining voting statistics from 1952 
thru 1958 for president and governor in both Lehigh County and 
Allentown, with the exception of 1954 when the county went Democratic 
and the city voted Republican, the returns followed the pattern of the 
registration figures. 
..Morning Call, October 12, 1960, p. 5. 
.?See Footnote 6. 
Figures courtesy of Lehigh County Voter Registration Office. 
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Table 3.7.  Lehigh County Vote Totals for President 
and Governor 1952-1958 
Republican Democrat 
1952 Eisenhower-45,143 Stevenson-33,033 
1954 Wood-28,766 Leader-31,595 
1956 Eisenhower-50,564 Stevenson-29,067 
1958 McGonigle-35,635 Lawrence-34,199 
Table 3.8.  City of Allentown Vote Totals for President 
and Governor 1952-1958 
Republican Democrat 
1952 Eisenhower-23,430 Stevenson-17,953 
1954 Wood-16,229 Leader-14,618 
1956 Eisenhower-24,707 Stevenson-15,026 
1958 McGonigle-16,995 Lawrence-16,915 
On Sunday, September 25, 1960 a study by the University of 
Michigan's Survey Research Center entitled "The American Voter" 
received some publicity in the Sunday Call-Chronicle.  The article 
applied Lehigh County to the study and asked, 
"How steadfast is the average voter in Lehigh County in his 
allegiance to a particular party? Can the local vote for 
president in the forth coming election be forecast on the basis 
of past performance?" 
The survey revealed that individuals selected their party early in 
life usually by age thirty and that identification remained stable 
after it was established. As a result "practically no change in the 
relative size or age composition of the parties has occurred in the 
last decade."   The article proceded to list the 1948, 1952 and 1956 
votes for president in Lehigh County.  By totalling the result from 
each election it was concluded that for those three elections 59% of 
the people voting in Lehigh County voted Republican while 41% voted 
_ 
..See Footnote 8. 
,,-Figures courtesy of Lehigh County Voter Registration Office. 
1fiAllentown Sunday Call-Chronicle, September 25, 1960, p. 13. 
Ibid., p. 13. 
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Democrat.  The reader was then left to draw the conclusion based on 
this analysis that the Lehigh County voter was not likely to desert 
this Republican tradition and cross over to the Democratic candidate 
in 1960.  This conclusion was substantiated, at least as far as the 
Call-Chronicle was concerned, in a November 4, 1960 Morning Call 
article entitled "Individualism & Tradition in Ticket-Splitting Lehigh 
County." This article stated that Lehigh County went for Republican 
Thomas Dewey for president in 1944 when the Democrats held a 
registration lead.  It stated: 
"The county's choice has differed from the Nations in two of five 
presidential elections over the past twenty years. Lehigh voters 
not only have their own favorites for presidents they also have a 
tendency to split their tickets." 
Having reviewed all of these figures from the three county area, 
I have reached a number of conclusions as to why Lehigh County and 
Allentown became the focus of both parties and why both candidates for 
president and vice-president made personal appearances in this area. 
The first reason was stated previously and that was the population of 
this region. As the fourth largest metropolitan area of Pennsylvania 
it was too large for either party to ignore.  Secondly, the 
Republicans were confident that personal visits by their candidates 
would help produce a victory simply because past voting patterns have 
established this trend.  Thirdly, the Democrats were encouraged by the 
registration statistics which indicated an increasing number of 
Democrats and thus a distinct possibility that the area would support 
their candidates.  The tradition of ticket-splitting was the fourth 
Morning Call, November 10, 1960, p. 4. 
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reason which served as an attraction for both parties.  It added a 
further element of uncertainty to the area suggesting that Lehigh 
County was capable of swinging to either party.  A fifth factor in 
choosing Allentown as a location to make a public appearance (only 
Lodge who spoke in Bethlehem and Easton did not deliver a major speech 
in Allentown) was that it was the home of the region's major 
newspaper, the Allentown Call-Chronicle.  Circulation was widespread 
throughout Eastern Pennsylvania and by visiting Allentown, the 
candidates could make the most of the media and at the same time visit 
the most populated city in the area. Consequently, both parties 
believed there was a great deal to be gained by concentrating on this 
section of Pennsylvania.  If Kennedy would carry Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh and Nixon would run strong in the suburbs and rural areas 
of the state, it was reasoned that the Lehigh Valley region might well 
decide who was going to carry Pennsylvania. 
There is, however, one additional factor that needs to be 
mentioned as to why all the candidates appeared here.  The age of the 
jet had arrived and although the candidates still used propeller type 
aircraft the use of jets provided increased mobility.   Stanley 
Kelley, Jr. provides evidence of this mobility with the following 
schedules. 
"On the two days of September 2 and 3, Senator Kennedy spoke in 
Manchester, New Hampshire; Presque Isle, Bangor and Portland 
Maine; San Francisco, California; and Anchorage and Palmer, 
Alaska.  As Nixon began his formal campaign in a jet aircraft, he 
spoke one morning in Baltimore, that noon in Indianapolis, that 
afternoon in Dallas and that evening in San Francisco." 
__ 
Kelley, "The Presidential Campaign," p. 86. 
iyibid. 
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It is because of this increased mobility that many of the lesser 
populated areas of different states, the Lehigh Valley among them, 
hosted the candidates. 
Improvements to the Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton Airport aided in 
the candidates appearances as well.  Because the runways at the 
airport had recently been extended, the candidates aircraft were able 
to utilize the facility during the campaign. John Henry Leh, Chairman 
of the Lehigh-Northampton Airport Authority, commenting on the arrival 
and departure of the candidates in the Lehigh Valley said, 
"It was difficult in 1956 for major candidates to visit the area 
because runways were not long enough.  There was a time when 
candidates could tour by train making whistle stops in 
communities throughout the nation.  That method of campaigning is 
fast coming to an end. Expansion of the ABE Airport which is a 
continuing process made this section a major stop for the 
presidential and vice presidential candidates." 
Having identified why the candidates came to the Lehigh Valley, I 
will now examine the speeches that they delivered during their 
respective visits to determine what issues were raised and why they 
thought these issues were important. 
20 Morning Call, November 1, 1960, p. 7, 
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Chapter Four - The Candidates Speak 
During nearly all election campaigns individuals of recognizable 
political stature make speeches to promote their parties candidates. 
The 1960 election was no exception. What was unusual, however, was 
the number of party spokesman that appeared in the Lehigh Valley. In 
addition to the candidates themselves, the Republicans heard 
Pennsylvania Senator Hugh Scott, Senator Everret Dirksen of Illinois 
and long time Pittsburgh Congressman James Fulton. The Democrats 
entertained Mrs. Joseph Kennedy, the candidate's mother, former 
Postmaster General James Farley, Connecticut Governor Abraham 
Ribicoff, New Jersey Senator Harrison Williams, former Pennsylvania 
Governor George Leader and Philadelphia Mayor Richardson Dilworth. 
This type of activity helped to generate great voter interest in both 
parties and aided in enlisting volunteers.  It was noted that "more 
doorbells than ever before are being rung" and party headquarters are 
opening throughout the Lehigh Valley including Allentown, Bethlehem, 
West Bethlehem, Easton and Slatington. 
The Morning Call commenting on all the political personalities in 
this region stated, 
"Never in the history of this area have so many top-ranking 
spokesmen of both the Republican and Democratic parties sought 
out the Lehigh Valley to woo favor.  It is doubtful that the 
Lehigh Valley ever before entertained-even at "whistle stops"-the 
top four candidates for national office." 
2Sunday Call-Chronicle, October 9, 1960, p. 14. 
Morning Call, October 21, 1960, p. 5. 
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As the dates of the candidates visits approached both parties, 
hoping for massive turnouts by the public, ran large advertisements in 
area newspapers and circulated flyers noting the date, time and 
location of their appearances as well as the route of their 
motorcades. 
Lyndon B. Johnson - October 18, 1960 
Scheduled to deliver his address at 7:00 P.M. at the Frolics 
Ballroom in Allentown, Lyndon Johnson, delayed repeatedly by throngs 
of onlookers in Williamsport, Shamokin and other Pennsylvania towns 
along his motorcade route, finally arrived two and one-half hours 
3 
late.  An exuberant overflow crowd greeted him with banners, cheers 
and applause in what was described as the kind of rally "youngsters 
hear their grandparents talk about."  Accompanied by Richardson 
Dilworth, the Mayor of Philadelphia and Chairman of Pennsylvania 
Citizens for Kennedy and Johnson, the Vice-Presidential candidate was 
introduced by Donald Hock the Democratic candidate for Congress. 
His message revolved around the religious issue, a stronger 
America under the Democratic Party, and attacks on Vice-President 
Nixon.  The religious issue, although not mentioned in the final draft 
of Johnson's speech (no exact text is available), received the 
greatest attention in the Allentown press.  The boldfaced headline of 
Tlbid., October 19, 1960, p. 6. 
hbid. 
See Document from the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, "Speech For Senator 
Lyndon B. Johnson Allentown, PA, October 18, 1960, "Final Draft 
October 13, 1960, and letter to author from Linda Hanson, Archivist, 
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, March 9, 1979. 
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The Allentown Morning Call appearing the morning after Johnson's talk, 
declared, "Johnson Blasts Religious Issue in Campaign Before Cheering 
Crowd of 4,500 in Allentown, Voices Pleas to End Hate, Prejudices." 
Johnson reminded his audience that no one asked what church Joe 
Kennedy Jr. belonged to when he volunteered for a secret mission in 
WWII and was killed.  He noted that as the great-grandson of a Baptist 
Minister and the grandson of two Confederate veterans, he opened his 
campaign in Boston and the reception he received proved that "the 
hatred and the bigotry of the 1860's had not carried over there in the 
1960's."  Furthermore, when Kennedy went to Texas "the crowds which 
greeted him were the greatest in its history surpassing those of both 
Roosevelt and Truman.  Johnson said, 
"I pray that on November 8th the crowds will again turn out for 
the Catholic grandson of a poor Irish immigrant.  I pray that we 
have forgotten the prejudices and hates that have hurt this 
country in many ways down through the years." 
At one point a "thunderous" two minute standing ovation erupted when 
Johnson asked that religion be eliminated as a campaign issue. 
Using Pennsylvania's depressed anthracite region as an example, 
Johnson spoke of unemployment, and the economic recession.  He also 
called for better educational programs, medical care for senior 
citizens, redevelopment in the cities and the elimination of farm 
surpluses.   All of these programs were at the heart of the 
Democratic Party's desire for the future. Johnson stated, 
7Morning Call, October 19, 1960, p. 1. 
'ibid. 
Jlbld. 
Ibid., p. 6. 
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"If you want to work—if you want to produce—if you want to 
build a better and stronger America, then come along with us. 
That is the great mission of the Democratic Party and of John F. 
Kennedy and myself." 
Johnson was very critical of Vice-Preident Nixon's efforts to 
focus the attention of the campaign on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu 
which were 9,000 miles away while Communism crept into Cuba some 
ninety miles from the United States.  "Like a drowning man, grasping 
at straws, he has reached for Quemoy and Matsu.  I have heard of 
candidates running away from issues but never quite that far," he 
12 
stated.   He pledged that the next administration must adopt new 
foreign policies. 
Although Johnson was extremely well received by the crowd in 
attendance and by those with whom he spoke along his motorcade route, 
the October 20, 1960 editorial of the Morning Call entitled "Misusing 
Religious Issue" took the opposite view.  Kennedy and Nixon were both 
commended for trying to keep religion out of the campaign as much as 
possible.  However, Johnson's "soundness of judgement" was questioned 
because he raised this issue in an emotional manner by "resorting to 
the cheapest sort of political demagoguery." The editorial went on to 
say that the Vice-Presidential candidate was "just as guilty as those 
he criticizes for bigotry," because of the way he used the issue to 
drum up votes.  "His was a crude play to the gallery and a 
not-so-clever evasion of many important issues he could have touched 
upon," the editorial stated.  Perhaps its strongest statements were: 
1?See "Speech For Senator Johnson Allentown, October 18, 1960, p. 3. 
Ibid., p. 5. 
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"The more Lyndon Johnson speaks across the land the more he proves he 
is not in the same league as John Kennedy...Democrats can be thankful 
indeed that he did not win the presidential nomination." 
Why did Johnson select these issues, particularly the religious 
question, when he must have certainly known it would open him to 
criticism? A review of the Allentown background material supplied to 
Johnson's staff previous to his appearance reveals that the 
candidate's talk was built around comments by local political sources. 
A document entitled "Comments on Allentown, Pennsylvania From Local 
Political Sources" suggests that Johnson be aware of the religious 
issue, Cuba versus Quemoy and Matsu, and our future prosperity among 
other issues.  The document stated, "This is 'Dutch Country' and the 
religious problem is strong.  Senator Johnson should answer it by 
saying that he, as a Southern non-Catholic, has no problems and, in 
13 fact is proud to run on the ticket with John F. Kennedy."   It 
further stated that: "Foreign policy is a good issue in Allentown. 
Senator Johnson should stress that there needs to be more concern with 
14 Communism in Cuba than with Communism in Quemoy and Matsu."   As 
stated earlier, it was these very issues that Johnson addressed. 
Johnson raised the religious question in most of his speeches 
particularly in the South. Aside from a film of Kennedy addressing 
the problem before the Houston ministers which was used in Protestant 
areas, Kennedy remained silent and let his running mate speak for him 
__ 
See "Comments on Allentown, PA From Local Political Sources," Lyndon 
,B. Johnson Library. 
Ibid. Johnson addressed. 
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during the remainder of the campaign.   It is therefore the 
conclusion of this writer that Johnson was fulfilling two obligations 
during his appearance in Allentown when he raised the religious issue. 
One he was responding to the local indication that it was of deep 
concern in the Lehigh Valley and secondly, he was addressing this 
issue so that Kennedy would be free to concentrate on the more serious 
policy questions.  Johnson was indeed successful for the printed media 
highlighted his comments on religion in their coverage of his speech. 
Richard M. Nixon - October 22, 1960 
Vice-President Richard Nixon arrived in Allentown late on the 
Saturday afternoon of October 22 to complete a day of campaigning in 
Southeastern Pennsylvania.  His schedule called for brief comments 
upon arrival at ABE Airport, a motorcade to the Americus Hotel for 
dinner followed by what was labeled a major address at Muhlenberg 
Colleges' Memorial Hall and then back to the airport for a flight to 
Washington.   According to a Republican party official the requests 
for tickets were overwhelming and "never in the memory of the county 
committee has there been such tremendous interest in a candidate." 
Nixon's appearance in Allentown followed on the heels of the 
fourth televised debate the previous night where he hit hard on 
Senator Kennedy's Cuban position.  The Muhlenberg address was much the 
same with Nixon listing three major issues which in his opinion raised 
doubts whether "the candidate of the other party can keep the peace 
jgKelley, "The 1960 Presidential Election," p. 197. 
17Allentown Sunday Call-Chronicle, October 23, 1960, p. 1 and 4. 
Morning Call, October 20, 1960, p. 5. 
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without surrender" and "extend freedom throughout the world." 
Drawing on his familiar foreign policy theme, the Vice-President drew 
distinct lines of difference between himself and Senator Kennedy on 
Quemoy and Matsu, President Eisenhower's refusal to apologize to 
Khrushchev for U-2 flights over Soviet territory, and their respective 
positions on Cuba. 
In a letter to Richard Nixon I asked him why foreign policy was 
the theme of his Allentown address and whether or not he felt this 
particular region of Pennsylvania would support him because of his 
foreign policy positions. He responded by stating: 
"As you will note from the text, I referred to the televised 
debate we had had the night before. The major issues of that 
debate were in the area of foreign policy.  I tried in the speech 
to elaborate on some of those issues which I had been able to 
discuss only briefly in the debate because of time limitations. 
In a word I was addressing my remarks primarily to the national 
rather than the local audiences. 
However, I would not have spoken on such complex issues unless I 
had felt that the Muhlenberg audience was sophisticated enough to 
want to hear something more than the usual campaign stamp speech. 
From having campaigned in that area in previous elections, I had 
learned that people there were above average in intelligence and 
that they had as much interest in international issues as they 
did in the more mundane domestic issues." 
In his talk, pointing to Senator Kennedy's position not to defend 
Quemoy and Matsu in case of an attack by the Communist Chinese, Nixon 
stated that it was President Eisenhower's decision to defend them in 
1955 that has prevented Formosa from being attacked and thus, we have 
been spared from war.  Kennedy's position, Nixon stated, "raises a 
__ 
United States Senate, Freedom of Communications, Final Report of the 
Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee of the Subcommittee on 
Communications, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Part II, "The Speeches 
of Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, Presidential Campaign of 1960," 
p. 707. 
Letter from Richard Nixon to author, July 27, 1982. 
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very grave question in the minds of the American people as to whether 
20 he understands what peace demands in dealing with the Communists." 
The candidate's next item recalled Soviet Premier Khrushchev's 
demand at the Paris Peach Conference that President Eisenhower 
apologize for the U-2 flights over Russia.  Stating that these were 
necessary to determine if the Soviets were planning an offensive 
against the United States, Nixon criticized Kennedy for saying that 
the United States could have expressed regrets.  His point was that to 
apologize was to back down to Khruhschev and as a result we could 
21 
expect to have him "stomp on us again."   His implication here was 
that Kennedy was soft on Communism and did not know how to stand up to 
the Soviet leader as Nixon had already done. 
The issue of Cuba, however, was where Nixon came down the hardest 
on his Democratic opponent.  Kennedy proposed United States government 
intervention to support a revolution against Castro's Cuba.  Nixon 
told the Muhlenberg audience "that this is the most shockingly 
reckless proposal ever made in our history by a presidential candidate 
22 during a campaign."   In Nixon's opinion this was unthinkable because 
in the first place we would be violating "five treaties with the 
Organization of American States including the Treaty of Bogota of 
20 
United States Senate, Freedom of Communications, "Speeches of 
Richard Nixon, 1960," p. 708. 
fhbid., p. 709. 
Ibid., p. 710. 
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23 1946"  and secondly, we would be operating contrary to the United 
24 Nations Charter. 
Over and above these two considerations though, Nixon feared that 
Kennedy's call for United States intervention was "a direct invitation 
25 for the Soviet Union to intervene militarily on the side of Castro." 
Nixon went on to say that if they do intervene, 
"It can only mean a civil war in Cuba which the United States 
would not avoid entering and this result could easily be spread 
into a conflict, into a world war that every American of both 
parties wants to avoid; and I say that Senator Kennedy owes it to 
the Nation to put the cause of peace and freedom before political 
consideration and to retract this immature, rash and dangerous 
suggestion that he has made." 
Nixon's solution to the problem was a diplomatic and economic 
quarantine which was already underway and which he would continue as 
president.  In any case, he did not say how this would work, nor what 
effect it may have on our long term relationship with Cuba and the 
Soviet Union. 
The Republican nominee closed the major segment of his speech by 
saying that when looking at these three issues of foreign policy, many 
Americans should be convinced "that they could not rest well at night 
with a man with such total lack of judgement as Commander-in-Chief of 
27 
our Armed Forces in this critical period." 
Turning briefly to the importance of the experience that Henry 
Cabot Lodge lent to the Republican ticket, he said that together they 
will strengthen the United Nations and develop "new instruments of 
"ibid., p. 711. 
254Ibid. 
^Ibid., p. 711-712. 
fflbld.. p. 712. 
Ibid. 
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28 peace."   They knew the Communist leaders of the world and only they 
would be able to deal with them without surrender, was his 
implication. 
Using a college education as an example of one way to move the 
nation's economy forward, Nixon called for federal scholarships to be 
given "on the basis of both need and ability." and the expansion of 
the existing loan program as well as tax deducations and audits for 
29 those who pay college expenses. 
Finally, appealing to the audiences' patriotism he said that we 
as Americans have something more to offer. 
"We stand for ideals, for moral and spiritual strength...for 
faith that caught the imagination of the world a hundred and 
eighty years ago." 
Nixon's Muhlenberg address was consistent with the nationwide 
issues outlined earlier. His emphasis on foreign affairs to keep 
America strong abroad, his defense of, and support for the positions 
of President Eisenhower, and the experience factor of both he and 
Lodge were emphasized.  An examination of Nixon's speeches in the 
final weeks of the campaign reveals that he became increasingly 
31 
critical of Kennedy,  and the Allentown speech was no exception. 
The mention of expanded scholarship and loan programs was 
logically well chosen because of his appearance on a college campus 
and the concentration of other colleges in the Lehigh Valley. 
__ 
^ribid., p. 713. 
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The Cuban issue was one that Nixon seized upon in the fourth 
debate and was hopeful of using to his full advantage by demonstrating 
to the public that John Kennedy's position was poorly chosen and in 
fact, quite dangerous.  It was this issue that he stressed the most 
and clearly the issue the Allentown newspapers gave the most coverage. 
He later won editorial endorsement from the Call-Chronicle Newspapers. 
With respect to carrying Pennsylvania, Nixon stated afterward: 
"Pennsylvania is one of seven vital states in the campaign. We 
plan to carry Pennsylvania. It's a real battleground. We are 
going to carry the„Keystone State and that means we are going to 
carry the nation." 
During his five hour stay in Allentown, police estimated that 
100,000 people turned out to see the Vice-President and Mrs. Nixon. 
Newsmen traveling with the Nixons labeled the Allentown reception as 
"one of the most enthusiastic of the campaign" and were particularly 
33 
surprised by the large number of people that lined the city streets. 
Henry Cabot Lodge - October 26, 1960 
The Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Henry Cabot Lodge 
arrived at the Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton Airport at 2:00 A.M. on 
October 26th and was greeted by what he considered an "astonishing 
34 turnout."   Described as very tired, Lodge spent the remainder of the 
night at the Hotel Bethlehem and prepared for his two mid-day rallies. 
The first was held in Easton's Center Square and the second on 3rd 
_ 
-Morning Call, October 24, 1960, p. 5. 
_,Ibid., p. 6. 
Allentown Evening Chronicle, October 26, 1960, p. 9. 
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Street in Bethlehem across from what was formerly the main office of 
the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. 
The theme of Lodge's talks centered on experience, leadership and 
the inability of the opposition to deal with Cuba.  He told both 
audiences that the Republican party is "the party of experience in 
world affairs and that it is the one to provide economic security and 
35 growth on the domestic scene."   Calling attention to Nixon's years 
as Vice-President, Lodge noted that because of Nixon's visits to all 
parts of the globe he understood the Communist World and the tactics 
of its leadership.  He stated, "Nixon knows communism knows Khrushchev 
and knows how to deal with them." 
"Under the United Nations," the former Ambassador said, "we want 
a man to lead the world to new highs, away from being under the shadow 
of the cold war." The new administration, Lodge noted, 
"must be able to work in harmony with Adenauer, DeGaulle, and 
MacMillan and cope with Khrushchev and the Communist World. 
Choose leadership that will stand up to the Communists*  I have 
stood up to the Russians myself and I'm proud of it." 
Citing the inexperience of the opposition, Lodge illustrated with 
the Cuban issue.  He stated that Kennedy's call for the strengthening 
of anti-Castro forces would violate United States treaties with Latin 
American countries.  He commented, "if Kennedy did not know this he 
was alarmingly ill-informed; and if he did know, he was 
extraordinarily rash and irresponsible."   Lodge then pointed out 
_ 
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that as Ambassador to the United Nations he was responsible for 
referring the Cuban problem from the United Nations to the 
Organization of American States. 
Asked about the G.O.P. prospects for the election, Lodge 
commented, 
"Things are looking very good in Pennsylvania. The people are 
taking this (election) seriously.  They're concerned, 
particularly about America's foreign relations, and when the 
people are concerned they look for leadership that is talented 
and experienced. Ours is the party that offers this kind of 
leadership." 
Emphasizing the tickets leadership and experience particularly in 
foreign affairs, Lodge reiterated the pitch of the national campaign 
in the Lehigh Valley and followed-up on the points raised by Nixon in 
his address in Allentown. Although Lodge did not appear in Lehigh 
County he received front page newspaper coverage throughout the Valley 
and achieved his objective of stressing the Republican campaign theme. 
At the same time he personally appeared in the cities of Bethlehem and 
Easton where Nixon did not campaign. 
John F. Kennedy - October 28, 1960 
In the closing weeks of the campaign, John F. Kennedy began to 
once again repeat his earlier statements that the United States had 
40 lost it's prestige among other nations.   It was this very point that 
Kennedy put across in three hard hitting speeches in Bethlehem and 
Allentown.  Appearing first at a Democratic breakfast in the Hotel 
39  I 
,-Ibid., p. 5. 
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Bethlehem, Kennedy spoke next at the Moravian College field house and 
completed his talks at an outdoor rally in Center Square Allentown, 
41 
all in the space of about three hours. 
Repeating much of the same speech at each location, Senator 
Kennedy hurled a mass of facts and figures at his exuberant crowds 
42 totaling close to 85,000.   His theme, however, was very clear, let's 
"get America moving again." 
"There are sharp issues which separate Mr. Nixon and myself, as 
to how this country should move forward, what our obligations are 
in this country, how we can build strength that will make us,. 
secure in the world, and will advance the cause of freedom,"  he 
declared at Moravian. 
Only a "powerful, committed, dedicated and moving America" could in 
his words, meet these challenges and carry our nation into the new 
decade. Kennedy pointed to three basic differences between himself 
and Nixon, including U.S. position in the world, the American economy, 
and steps necessary to strengthen the nation. 
Citing surveys by the State Department and other sources, Kennedy 
stated they all indicated that our prestige abroad had fallen.  To 
reverse this decline Kennedy implored we must build the "kind of 
society here in the United States that strengthens the cause of 
44 freedom"  and that this in turn will serve to move our nation ahead 
with a sense of purpose and thus, enhance our strength and position 
around the world. 
41 
42Morning Call, October 29, 1960, p. 1. 
Ibid. Note because of the similarity of Senator Kennedy's remarks 
in Allentown and Bethlehem both speeches were used for the analysis. 
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Chastising Nixon for his campaign slogan "We've never had it so 
good," Kennedy noted that the Vice-President did not make use of it to 
any great degree in Pennsylvania.  He did not, in Kennedy's opinion, 
because in an eight year period, the nation has endured two recessions 
and in 1960 an economic slowdown which resulted in the steel mills of 
Pennsylvania and the United States operating at one-half of their 
45 
capacity, resulting in a layoff of 100,000 steelworkers. 
The Massachusetts Senator stated that when it comes to housing, 
medical care for senior citizens, employment, education or development 
of our natural resources, the present administration has not "set our 
goals high enough" nor has it provided "the means and the mechanism" 
46 to conquer our problems.   Stating that many Latin American, African 
and Asian nations are on the brink of making a decision whether or not 
they will choose Communism or free government, Kennedy concluded, we 
cannot compete with Khrushchev or Communism if our facilities are 
under-used and our people are out of work.  In a further reference to 
the Soviet Union he said that they are putting twice as high a 
percentage of their national income into education as the United 
States. 
Having the attention of a large college audience at Moravian, 
Kennedy quoted some significant figures relevant to higher education. 
"Thirty percent of our brightest boys and girls who graduate from high 
tflbld., p. 788. 
Tjjlbld., p. 787. 
4/Ibld., p. 786. 
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school never see the inside of college," he said. He went on to say 
that by 1970 twice the number of young people will be trying to go to 
college then did in 1960, necessitating the construction of more 
college buildings over the next ten years than we have built in the 
48 
entire history of our nation. 
This paved the way for additional criticism of the incumbent 
Republican Administration, noting that a bill the Congress passed in 
1959 to provide low interest loans for college classroom and dormitory 
construction was vetoed by the President and not yet enacted.  Kennedy 
was applauded when he stated, 
"I don't think this state, this country or this society of ours 
will move ahead until every child who has the talent to develop a 
superior intelligence, capability, or skill,Qis given a chance to 
do it regardless of his race or his color." 
In Allentown, Kennedy made a specific reference to Nixon's speech 
at Muhlenberg College a week earlier, stating that if he were a 
Republican one topic he would be reluctant to discuss would be Cuba. 
What he really should have discussed, Kennedy asserted, is "how we are 
going to build a strong society here in the United States."   Kennedy 
closed his brief Allentown speech by comparing Nixon to the likes of 
McKinley, Coolidge, Harding, Hoover, Landon, and Dewey whereas his 
party produced Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman and he pledged to carry on 
in their traditions of moving this nation forward. 
Apparently Kennedy tailored his remarks in Allentown and 
Bethlehem to influence two constituencies. His references to 
*j?Ibld., p. 786-787. 
^Ibid., p. 787. 
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recession, economic slowdown and unemployment were obviously geared to 
the large local membership in the United Steelworkers of America, and 
the United Auto Workers as well as other Lehigh Valley union members. 
In addition to his comments about the steel industry, Kennedy noted 
that by mid-November of 1960, the United States will have an inventory 
52 
of nearly a million automobiles which is the highest in our history. 
This, of course, was extremely important to both the steel and the 
auto industries.  Furthermore, Kennedy enjoyed a 91.6% voting record 
on labor issues as established by the AFL-CIO whereas Nixon was rated 
53 
a poor 13%.   He was therefore, able to speak openly on issues 
affecting the working men and women of the Lehigh Valley and could 
expect to gain their support for his positions. 
The second group he attempted to attract were the educators, 
students and families of college-age students throughout the area. 
His remarks on college education and the administration's veto of 
legislation were certainly well received by those who heard his 
comments or read them in the newspapers. 
An observation appearing in Time concerning Kennedy's method of 
delivery, I believe, is appropriate to the Senator's Allentown 
address. 
"His speeches are breathlessly brief:  never more than five 
minutes in daytime appearances, with an outside limit of 20 in an 
evening speech...Kennedy seems almost apologetic about keeping 
his audiences too long; he plunges directly to the issue at hand 
with only the barest amenities for the local celebrities and 
races quickly through to the end..." 
qillbld., p. 786. 
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By late morning, Senator Kennedy was on his way out of Allentown 
for further engagements in Pottsville, Hazelton, Wilkes-Barre and 
Scranton. He later expressed satisfaction with his showing to aide 
Dave Powers, indicating he felt certain he would win Pennsylvania. 
55 Letter from Dave Powers, Curator John F. Kennedy Library to author, 
March 5, 1979. 
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Chapter Five - A Local Look at the Issue 
A review of the comments of the candidates and the newspaper 
accounts of their visits clearly indicate issues that they believed 
important to this area.  However, the question remains, were these the 
same issues that were on the minds of the people in Lehigh County? 
In an attempt to answer this question a series of interviews were 
conducted with individuals who were integral parts of the 1960 
election in Lehigh County.  The individuals selected for the 
interviews were former Republican Congressman Willard Curtain and his 
Democratic opponent Attorney Donald Hock; two candidates for the State 
Legislature from the Allentown District, Republican Attorney John 
Backenstoe and Democratic Attorney David Mellenberg; and the two party 
chairmen from Lehigh County, Republican Moulton C. L. Frantz and 
Democratic Attorney Roy Reabuck. 
All six individuals were contacted in an effort to secure their 
cooperation and then were sent a list of the following questions in 
order to prepare for their response. 
1. What issues were on the people's minds locally? 
2. What was going to influence them to vote? 
3. What were the strengths and weaknesses of each candidate for 
President? 
4. Why do you believe they took the time to visit Allentown? 
5. Did their visit have an influence on Allentown voters? 
6. What was your reaction to the outcome? 
Hock, Backenstoe and Mellenberg all participated in a personal 
taped interview where these questions were posed.  Reabuck responded 
55 
over the telephone and Curtain, because he now lives in Florida, 
answered in writing.  Frantz, after reviewing the questions, 
apologetically declined to answer because of poor health. A review of 
the five who did respond provides an interesting insight into the 
election from their perspective as local participants. 
Willard Curtain recalled that the issues stressed in his 
district were "the usual liberal versus conservative positions." Two 
Call-Chronicle editorials reinforce Curtains statements.  The 
September 28, 1960 editorial in the Morning Call stated, 
"Basically their goals are common.  Additionally their 
contrasting means for reaching them are the principal reason for 
the current debate...Mr. Kennedy would strive toward them by 
expanding the powers of federal government in the areas of both 
legislation and taxation...Mr. Nixon would reach them by using 
the powers of the federal government to strengthen government at 
all levels to encourage and stimulate individual enterprise." 
The Sunday Call-Chronicle of October 2, 1960 noted the following, 
"The Nixon approach was unmistakably that of the Republican party 
- to undertake whatever social and welfare programs are necessary 
over and above what individuals and local communities can do for 
themselves; to protect personal incomes against inflation; to 
manage government affairs in a prudent and business like manner; 
to encourage private enterprise in creating new employment 
opportunities; to keep the federal government out of business and 
the affairs of the voters as far as possible...Kennedy's position 
was in keeping with the traditional program of the Democratic 
party and platform:  Unlimited social experimentation; 
encouraging inflation as a means to stimulating the economy; 
massive government intervention in the economy; a much more 
liberal and expensive approach to practically all welfare 
programs." 
By publishing these comments the newspaper consciously made this 
liberal versus conservative distinction between the candidates. 
Letter from Willard Curtain to author, July 21, 1982.  Unless 
otherwise noted all Curtain comments and quotations are taken from 
this letter. 
^Morning Call, September 28, 1960, p. 16. 
Sunday Call-Chronicle, October 2, 1960, p. 22. 
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Looking at the leadership question in a local campaign address, 
Curtain criticized the Democrats call for leadership by stating, 
"The top heavy Democratic majority in the House has displayed an 
ineptness and a surprising lack of capability for leadership and 
yet in this campaign the party is stressing its need to lead the 
country." 
In the same speech he also rapped the Democratic policy of 
"unrestricted spending." 
Curtain believed that "both candidates were forceful and mixed 
well with the people and spoke largely to partisan crowds." He also 
stated very emphatically, "I do not believe that their respective 
appearances changed many votes.  The percentage of people voting were 
pretty much in line with the usual presidential vote." Disappointed 
with the outcome of the presidential race, Curtain expressed great 
personal satisfaction with his reelection as a member of Congress. 
Donald Hock pointed out that because no incumbent President was 
running and two new candidates were in the race, people took a greater 
interest in the election than they might have otherwise. Kennedy's 
focus on a need for a change was an important issue, but at the same 
time in the 8th Congressional, Hock stated, "many people felt the 
Republicans had been in and things aren't that bad, so lets keep them 
in.  There was alot or sentiment to that effect." According to Hock 
there were two issues that took on great importance. The first was 
religion.  "It didn't flare-up the way it did during Al Smith's 
campaign for President," Hock stated, "but it was there and I heard 
_ 
5Morning Call, October 4, 1960, p. 12. 
Interview, Donald Hock, Allentown, PA, August 8, 1982.  Unless 
otherwise noted, all Hock comments and quotations are taken from this 
interview. 
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people talking about it; not viciously, but they talked about it." He 
conceded, however, that "while religion was so much a part of the 
picture by the same token it was part of Kennedy's strength in some 
areas." 
The second issue was the importance of Lyndon Johnson, because he 
was an experienced leader of the Senate. Kennedy was smart to have 
Johnson run with him, Hock said, "because of the southern states that 
he needed and which he never would have won without Johnson." If 
Johnson was a geographic factor he also helped to balance the ticket 
as far as age was concerned because some voters thought Kennedy was 
too young. Yet Kennedy's youth also worked to his advantage. When 
comparing him to Eisenhower, as a young, energetic man, he was just 
the opposite of the President.  Because of this and because he 
possessed "tremendous personal charisma," Hock stated, Kennedy gained 
an advantage. 
As a Democrat, Hock spoke mostly about Kennedy, but he did note 
that Nixon did just not have the "strong personal appeal" that Kennedy 
had. He also felt that Nixon's ill-at-ease manner on the first 
television debate cost him many votes. 
Hock contended that both Kennedy and Nixon "came to Pennsylvania 
because it was a state they needed.  Coming to the Lehigh Valley was 
pretty much like going into Philadelphia or Pittsburgh because the 
Allentown, Bethlehem, Easton area was the fourth largest metropolitan 
area in Pennsylvania," he added. Although their appearances sparked 
enthusiasm, brought out crowds, and generated a good vote on election 
day, Hock generally agreed with Curtain that most of the voters had 
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made up their minds by the time the candidates came here. 
Reflecting on his defeat for Congress, Hock stated, in the 8th 
District where "Democrats just weren't winning", so having Kennedy as 
the head of the ticket was not an asset to him.  He did not "ride on 
the coatails" of Kennedy because the "voters had already made up their 
minds." 
State House candidate John Backenstoe,  identified three major 
issues that were on the minds of the public locally. They included the 
economy, the leadership ability of the presidential candidates and 
Kennedy's religion. Attorney Backenstoe stated the unions raised the 
economic issue, but he felt it was more important a few years earlier 
when unemployment was higher.  "I do not believe it had any great 
impact on the outcome," he said, "because at that time unemployment 
was not that bad in the Lehigh Valley." 
The second issue was who was best fit to be president because of 
their leadership ability. Many people believed, Backenstoe stated, 
"Nixon was best suited because he served as Vice-President for eight 
years under Eisenhower." He also noted that the "charisma" of Kennedy 
was strong but in some eyes he was too young to hold the nation's 
highest office.  Backenstoe commented that one of the best things 
Kennedy did was to name Johnson as his running mate for he added the 
total "balance of age, geography and philosophy." 
Interview, John Backenstoe, Allentown, PA, August 8, 1982.  Unless 
otherwise noted, all Backenstoe comments and quotations are taken 
from this interview. 
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He listed Kennedy's religion as the third issue of importance and 
mentioned that it worked as both an asset and a liability although it 
was not formally discussed. 
When asked to comment on why the candidates took the time to 
visit Allentown, Backenstoe said he believed that Pennsylvania was a 
key state to both campaigns because of the number of electoral votes. 
Furthermore, he noted this region was traditionally a swing area as 
"Lehigh County and Allentown elected Democrats to the Legislature and 
to the City Council despite the Republican registration lead." As a 
result, the conclusion of both campaign committees was that this area 
was one that they could win. 
It was Backenstoe's belief that the greatest influence of the 
candidate's visits was felt "among the party faithful" for they did 
most of the work leading up to election day. As far as the outcome he 
said, "We really didn't know down to the end.  Everybody thought it 
would be close." 
Attorney David Mellenberg one of Backenstoe's opponents believed 
that the underlying issue of the election in Allentown and Lehigh 
County was Kennedy's Catholicism.  At a meeting for legislative 
candidates in Harrisburg, he was told that "if local candidates come 
to the conclusion that Kennedy's religion was going to be an issue in 
your own county, you should, in some delicate fashion, run independent 
of Kennedy and not on his coatails." But to do that Mellenberg 
explained, "you had to be a potent local figure." As an unknown, he 
Interview David Mellenberg, Allentown, PA, July 26, 1982. Unless 
otherwise noted, all Mellenberg comments and quotations are taken 
from this interview. 
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was at a disadvantage, but the message was clear that the religious 
issue was going to be a factor.  According to Mellenberg, this became 
quite apparent after the election because as an unknown he got more 
votes in Allentown than Kennedy did. Without question he concludes 
that religion brought people out to vote.  "Whether they 
were Democrats or Republicans the results show that Kennedy lost 
substantially in Lehigh County despite the Democratic registration 
edge. 
If religion was a liability, Kennedy's greatest strength was his 
"youthfulness and vitality," Mellenberg stated.  "Johnson too was much 
more personable than on television. When you walked away from those 
rallies, it was just a question of how big they were going to win by 
because of the enthusiasm they generated.  He was quick to point out 
though that you can easily be misled by the enthusiasm factor because 
Kennedy and Johnson did not win in Lehigh County. 
Mellenberg's perception of Nixon was that he appeared "rather 
arrogant" and "not well liked by the press." He stated that had Nixon 
"developed a better relationship with the media" the results might 
have been different. 
In response to why the candidates visited this area, Mellenberg 
stated the Lehigh Valley was considered a keystone to the state just 
as Pennsylvania was to the nation.  The candidates came here because 
Kennedy wanted to turn the religious concerns around while Nixon, 
although it was never raised publically, wanted to attract those 
votes.  Both believed Pennsylvania was a swing state. 
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When offering his personal assessment of the campaign and its 
outcome, Mellenberg came back to the issue of religion once again and 
said it spelled defeat for both he and Kennedy in Lehigh County.  He 
concluded with this statement. 
"The electorate is not always that well informed.  They usually 
vote on something that strikes them as what they may consider 
very paramount - in this case, religion.  People have a tendency 
to isolate on an issue that really hits them.  The rest rise or 
fall on this.  It takes a strong local political figure to 
overcome a big tide against the head of the ticket." 
o 
Former Democratic Chairman Roy Reabuck listed two issues as the 
overriding factors in Kennedy's defeat. Number one was religion, and 
the second was the Call-Chronicle editorial endorsement for Nixon. 
Reabuck stated that many Democrats personally told him they would not 
vote for Kennedy because he was Catholic. Looking at the final 
results in Berks, Lehigh and Northampton, all of which had Democratic 
registration edges, it is evident that religion played a role. Berks 
and Northampton had large Democratic margins and Lehigh only a slight 
lead, yet Nixon won big in Berks and Lehigh and lost narrowly in 
Northampton. 
With respect to the Call-Chronicle editorial endorsement, Reabuck 
was adamant that it played a role. Because it was the only newspaper 
that many people in the area were exposed to, they had a tendency to 
be Influenced by the papers comments. Many Call-Chronicle editorials 
spoke highly of Nixon and questioned Kennedy.  On October 30th, the 
Sunday Call-Chronicle made an outright endorsement of Nixon and the 
_ 
Interview, Roy Reabuck, Allentown, PA, August 2, 1982.  Unless 
otherwise noted, all Reabuck comments and quotations are taken from 
this interview. 
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Morning Call editorial of November 4 th, did the same. After praising 
the Eisenhower-Nixon administration for ending the Korean War and 
keeping the peace, seeing more Americans employed at higher annual 
incomes, having spent more on national defense, investing more in the 
nation's growth and reducing individual income taxes they state: 
"This record constitutes the specific detailed foundations on 
which Vice-President Nixon has pledged to build a stronger, 
happier, greater America.  It is in marked contrastQto the vague 
generalities of John Kennedy's elaborate promises." 
The day after this statement appeared, Reabuck publicly 
criticized the Morning Call for it's position. His plea was not 
accepted, however, for on Monday, November 7th, the day before the 
election, the endorsement of Nixon and Lodge was repeated. 
9 
Morning Call, November 4, 1960, p. 18. 
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Conclusion 
The editorial in the Morning Call on October 29th stated that the 
candidates "cast little additional light on their respective positions 
during their visits to these parts.  But they did generate a 
tremendous amount of enthusiasm." A leading Republican from the area 
concurred, "I think this appearance of the big candidates in the 
Lehigh Valley created a hell of a big interest..."  Indeed the 
importance of the visits are found in the enthusiasm that they built 
among campaign volunteers and party workers and the added regional 
publicity that such events generate.  A local visit serves as a 
stimulus to the county organization to work harder in the closing days 
of the campaign to insure that every possible voter is reached. 
County Chairman Frantz noted, "I have never seen so many volunteers in 
2 
all my time in politics." 
Just after John Kennedy's visit, the Call-Chronicle Newspapers 
asked leading individuals of both parties what expectations they had 
for election day.  The following quotes reflect a portion of their 
rather interesting observations.  Spokesman for both parties agreed, 
"that in spite of practically equal party registration in Lehigh 
County, the Republican Party will take the county in the November 
election. 
A well known Democrat stated, 
"Democrats in the Lehigh Valley are more conservative than in 
many sections.  They are more like southern Democrats.  They do 
not go along with some of the Democratic government giveaways. 
2Sunday Call-Chronicle, October 30, 1960, p. 40. 
-Morning Call, November 8, 1960, p. 5. 
Sunday Call-Chronicle, October 30, 1960, p. 17. 
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For that reason they often do not vote or else vote for 
Republicans and that accounts for why we expect a Republican 
majority in Lehigh County even though the registration is 
slightly on the Democratic side." 
Both of these statements proved to be accurate as Lehigh County voters 
decided overwhelmingly in favor of Richard Nixon by giving him 1583 
votes more than the Republican Party had registered for the election, 
indicating Democrats crossed over and or stayed home. 
The Morning Call of November 8, 1960, stated that many observers 
agreed that because of Khrushchev and Castro foreign policy had taken 
on wide interest but the outcome of the election "is largely moot 
because of the religious factor."  Religion may well have been a 
factor in Allentown and Lehigh County because despite the 17.9% 
Catholic population,  the county also lies within the Protestant 
Pennsylvania Dutch region of the state which was referred to earlier 
as the "Bible belt." 
In addition, religion was mentioned as a significant issue by 
four of the five individuals interviewed and Lyndon Johnson made it 
the theme of this speech in Allentown. 
Apparently, religion did play a role in Lehigh County as the 
following figures show a big win for Nixon despite the Democratic 
registration edge. The same can be said for neighboring Berks (14.6% 
o 
Catholic) and Northampton (26.1% Catholic) Counties. 
glbld., p. 17 and 40. 
..Morning Call, November 9, 1960, p. 5. 
^Ibid., November 8, 1960, p. 5. 
William J. McKenna, "The Influence of Religion in the Pennsylvania 
Elections of 1958 and 1960," Pennsylvania History, 29, p. 409. 
Ibid. 
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Kennedy Nixon 
39,640 54,278 
41,552 40,683 
50,572 61,743 
57,177 67,501 
9 
Table C.l.  The 1960 Vote for President by County 
Lehigh 
Northampton 
Berks 
Burks 
Kennedy was trounced in Berks despite the very large registration lead 
in favor of the Democrats, but won narrowly in Northampton probably 
because of the larger percentage of Catholic voters.  In Bucks County, 
the Republican registration was too large for the 18.9% Catholic 
population  to make much difference. 
The Morning Call listed three reasons why Nixon carried Lehigh 
County.  Initially they stated that just about every registered 
Republican made it to the polls.  Secondly, they believed many 
Democrats voted straight Republican.  Finally, because of the heavy 
registration drive, many people registered Democratic because they 
were asked to. 
They did not believe religion was an issue because not a single 
Democrat running on the countywide ticket came within 10,000 votes of 
12 their Republican opponent.   What they failed to say was that if many 
Democrats voted straight Republican so might have many Republicans. 
Secondly, the races for the state legislature show that ticket 
splitting did occur as three of the four Democratic legislative 
candidates ran ahead of Kennedy while Nixon ran ahead of all four of 
__ 
lf)Richey, Pennsylvania Manual, 95, p. 513. 
McKenna, "The Influence of Religion in Pennsylvania Elections" 
Pennsylvania History, p. 409. 
^Morning Call, November 10, 1960, p. 5 and 7. 
Ibid. 
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13 the Republican legislative candidates in the county.   Regardless of 
the importance of foreign affairs, the economy or the leadership 
issue, Kennedy's religion was a factor in Lehigh County. 
Despite Nixon's convincing showing in Lehigh County, it proved 
fruitless as Senator Kennedy rolled up large margins in Philadelphia 
(331,544) and Allegheny County and Pittsburgh (107,485) and was able 
to overcome Nixon's strength throughout most of the rest of the 
state.   Democrats stated that "Lehigh was one of 53 Pennsylvania 
counties to give Nixon a majority, but noted that votes compiled in 
these counties enabled Kennedy to win the states after polling large 
pluralities in Philadelphia, Allegheny and Luzerne" three of the 14 
which favored Kennedy. 
Nixon stated, "I was not surprised when we carried the area 
(Lehigh County) by a substantial margin although disappointed, 
1 £ 
naturally,  by our narrow defeat nationwide. In his book Six Crisis, 
Nixon records his disappointment with  the outcome in Pennsylvania. 
"There was also bad news  from Pennsylvania:    Kennedy's margin was 
now 115,000.     Before giving up completely on that key  state, 
however, we  called Hugh Scott to  get his  appraisal.    He had been 
confident  that we would carry Pennsylvania,  though by a  close 
margin,  because he believed we would come  to the Philadelphia 
line with a  lead of  200,000 votes.     We had in fact reached that 
goal - but Kennedy  landslide in Philadelphia of  over 300,000 
votes,  exceeding even the huge margins that Roosevelt had rolled 
up in the depths of  the depression, had wiped out our outstate 
lead."1' 
_ 
Evening Chronicle, November 9, 1960, p. 38. of foreign affairs, the 
economy or the leadership issue, Kennedy's religion was a factor in 
Lehigh County. 
...Richey, Pennsylvania Manual, 95, p. 513. 
.,Morning Call, November 10, 1960, p. 7. 
r^Nixon letter author, July 27, 1982. 
Nixon, Six Crises, p. 411. 
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On the surface it appears that the record number of people who 
turned out to see the candidates in Allentown is matched by the high 
18 89%  voter turn out county wide on election day, thus demonstrating 
extreme interest on the part of the electorate.  Overall, it is 
evident that the candidates addressed those issues locally that they 
hoped would generate that all important campaign ingredient of 
enthusiasm, which in a close election would give them the edge they 
needed to win. Though in the end, other factors played a significant 
role in the outcome. 
18 
Morning Call, November 9, 1960, p. 5. 
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